

Rationale for Changes in Army National Guard



This is a modification to the original presentation, which is now embedded with rebuttal points to the often misleading and sometimes disingenuous information presented in this brief. Rebuttals are included in **red**, and many of the slides have additional comments included the comment section.

Bottom Line Up Front

- As the war in Afghanistan ends, we can begin to reduce the size of our Army
 - No longer sizing for prolonged stability operations
 - Smaller budget mandates a smaller force that we can keep ready and modern

This is just a return to the pre-9/11 Force Structure – so why cut the Guard now?

- We value the operational contributions of all components in the Army
 - Our response to crises has been and will be a Total Force response
 - We looked at our needs with the Total Force in mind
- We also looked to protect the National Guard from cuts as much as possible
 - They do cost less when we don't use them
 - They provide support to state governors daily
- From a state perspective, the force is going down—we have no choice
 - Insulating the National Guard from cuts means less active force
 - Less active force also impacts state jobs and homeland response

The Guard doesn't cost more *in combat*; if Guard units were authorized to do home station mobilization, the cost to ramp up and deploy a Guard unit could be minimized so that it really was not much more – if in fact the same cost – as an AC unit mobilization.

The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) decimates the Total Force, "One Team, One Fight" concept. It changes the Guard's mission to almost exclusively DOMOPs and select overseas missions, forcing a fundamental shift from the first charter of the Guard: *to be an operational reserve for the nation's military to defend our enemies – both foreign and domestic.*

The Guard has 2 roles:

1. First and foremost is to provide an operational and ready reserve to defend the Nation – meaning the ability to supplement the Active Component (AC) in any mission or conflict, anywhere in the world.
2. To assist the State when requested by the Governor.

GUARD MOBILIZATION:

The current mobilization process for the Guard is cumbersome, ineffective, and costly. The Guard has in the past successfully deployed from home station and for years has been asking for a return to this process. With OEF winding down, now is the time to change and streamline the process for the next conflict.

Overview

- Sizing the Army
- Implications to state active duty missions
- Aviation Restructure

Sizing the Army—Basis for Numbers

- Began with expected post-Afghanistan demands on Army

- Demands articulated by QDR

- Future, potential contingencies; global presence; homeland missions
- No longer sized for large, long-term stability operations - SEE NOTES

→ The most recent QDR was rejected by Senator Buck McKeon (R-CA). Read why in the comment section below.

- Other key assumptions

- Future conflicts occur with little or no notice—requires ready forces to respond on short timelines

- Immediate mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) elements needed to augment Active Component (AC)

Strategic Air Lift is the limiting factor for AC. NG is ready to backfill AC relatively quickly (between 30 - 60 days). The first AC units to go in are more often than not Special Operations Forces, as was the case following 9/11, not conventional active Army. Not all forces have to respond on a short timeline. Therefore, having the appropriate balance of AC and NG is critical. Cutting out NG removes the staying power of our Nation's military.

Strategically informed analysis of Total Force requirement

→ True, which includes keeping the Apache in the Guard to augment Active Duty. The Apache is a force multiplier to ground units, and NG units more than proved their merit in OEF/OIF.

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According to Congressman McKeon, "Unfortunately, the product the process produced this time has more to do with politics than policy and is of little value to decision makers. For that reason, I will require the Department to re-write and re-submit a compliant report. In defiance of the law, this QDR provides no insight into what a moderate-to-low risk strategy would be, is clearly budget driven, and is shortsighted." **Despite the protest of McKeon, the QDR was never rewritten.**

What's wrong with the QDR for 2014:

- Budget Driven: The FY14 QDR is heavily constrained by low budget levels. The law requires the QDR to identify resources not included in the Pentagon's 5 year spending plan. The whole point of the review is to identify the budget needed to address the evolving threat
- Shortsighted: The FY14 QDR only looks out 5 years, instead of the 20 years required by law.
- Assumes Too Much Risk: The law requires the QDR to offer a low-to-moderate risk plan for our forces and mission. By Secretary Hagel's own admission, this QDR accepts additional risks.

Read more at:

http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=BDA3450C-2CFA-4BA2-B428-CC26354A3163

ASSUMPTIONS:

The assumption that U.S. should not be sized for large, long-term **stability** operations incorrectly leads to the decision that we will not participate in **ANY** large, long-term operations. This could have severe consequences that would leave us exposed if a large or long term conflict arises. This is a dangerous premise to base our Nation's security on. Additionally, any overseas operation – whether small or large scale – can easily lead to the need for large, long-term stability operations. With few exceptions, this has been the case after most conflicts from the previous century.

→ Just because the Defense Budget shrinks, it doesn't mean the *Total Army* must shrink. The size can remain the same by shifting force structure to the NG – the less expensive component.

Sizing the Army—the Numbers

OSD

- Based on demands and assumptions, we estimated the following size force meets strategic needs with some risk:
 - 440-450K AC (13-15% cut relative to today's force)
 - 335K National Guard (5% cut)
- Pre 9/11, AC was about 480K; National Guard about 350K
 - AC grew to ~ 570K during the war; National Guard to ~360K

Using the pre 9/11 force totals, AC is facing an ~ 12.75% cut; NG an ~ 10% cut. This is a small difference, just over 2.5%. The math behind this is included in the comments section below.

 - At sequester, can support only 420K AC, 315K National Guard

The flaw here is that these very risks demand a larger force, not a smaller one – hence, keep or increase the Force Structure of the NG, given that is one-third the cost of AC.

 - Risks: shorter dwell times for units if:
 - Major combat operations are more demanding
 - Follow-on stability operations exceed planning estimates

~~Larger cut to AC than to RC~~

NG is more cost-effective than AC

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The Guard is a cheaper option to retain the Force Structure for the future fight, whenever and wherever that may be. It has been proven over time that AC can be built up rapidly enough, when the need arises. The key is to have a substantial – and now proven – NG base.

Who says equilateral cuts are the proper yard stick for this discussion? The threat should dictate the size of the defense pie, and the budget should dictate the number of expensive vs. inexpensive slices of the pie. The budget doesn't necessarily have to dictate the size of the pie.

THE NUMBERS:

What's not being acknowledged by Active Duty is the fact that their "cuts" are being compared to the "Grow the Army" baseline, a model that was temporarily approved in the support of the buildup following 9/11. The "Grow the Army" model was never meant to extend beyond OEF/OIF. Despite this, AC is using this as their justification that they face significantly more cuts than the NG. Here are the real numbers to keep in mind... using the pre 9/11 force totals, Active Duty faces a modest 12.85% reduction (from 482,000 to 420,000); the Guard faces a 10% reduction (from 350,000 to 315,000).

Implications of National Guard Force Cut

- Reduction to 335K means, on average, every state would lose about 300 Guardsmen
 - Reducing further to 315K would mean a loss of 700 Guardsmen
- At today's end strength of about 350K, average state allocation is 7,000 Guardsmen
 - Loss of 300 is about 5% cut; loss of 700 is about 10% cut, on average
 - In addition, most Guardsmen will not be deployed
 - Available pool will be much larger than what states have today - **Misses the point**
- Number of Guardsmen (Air and Army) on state active duty (SAD) nationwide:
 - Average per day in 2013: about 600 nationwide
 - Maximum during 2013: 1,822 nationwide
 - Any one state/territory has a small number of activated Guardsmen

~~100s needed daily, 1000s available~~

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100s needed daily for State Contingencies, 350,000 needed to defend the Nation

Homeland Defense and DOMOPs are only one part of what the Guard does. The other charter is as an operational reserve, as previously discussed on Slide 2. If the Guard is removed from the combat piece, the combat power that the Guard brings is LOST FOREVER. Protecting our Nation from enemies is the first and foremost mission of the Guard; DOMOPs is the second mission. **These slides incorrectly assume the opposite.**

Stating the “available pool will be much larger than what states have today” – this misses the point. A large available pool of Guard soldiers is not needed for Domestic Operations, but is needed to defend the Nation and it is at risk of being reduced from 350,000 to 315,000.

Other considerations for state response

OSD

- States/territories have sufficient Guardsmen within their states to meet these needs
 - Both from Army National Guard and nearly 100,000 Air National Guard
 - Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) provide a regional National Guard force for governors to draw upon
 - Recent legislation makes accessible hundreds of thousands of federal reserve forces from all services for such missions
- Major disasters (e.g., Hurricane Sandy) result in governors requesting federal assistance
 - In these cases, SECDEF brings a Total Force response under Title 10 authorities
 - National Guard likely still provides preponderance of forces, under Title 32 authorities
 - Dual-status commander authorities make for more efficient application of Total Force response

National Guard and the rest of the Total Force will still meet state needs

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National Guard State Response Activity

OSD

Security & Support

- Key Asset Protection
- Southwest Border
- Special Events
- ... more


Day-to-day need: 500-1,000 daily nationwide
Sourced by 350K Army NG, 100K Air NG

Severe Weather & Natural Disasters

- Fires
- Flood
- Hurricanes & Tropical Storms
- ... more

Major crises need: 1000s
Sourced by over 2M AC and RC

Total Man Days



It doesn't have to be "low density/high demand" – ARI is forcing this. ARI reduces the number of Attack/ Recon BNs by over 40% and violates Federal Law, making the AC and NG formations different.

Aviation Restructure

OSD

- Fundamental realignment of Army's aviation force
 - Reduce number of aircraft types from 7 to 4 through retirement of Kiowa Warrior, Kiowa Scout/trainer, and Jet Ranger trainer helos
 - Fewer types to recapitalize, maintain, spare, and train on
 - Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) becomes new trainer—requires increase of 100 LUHs in AC force
 - Savings go, in part, toward Apache and Blackhawk upgrades/recap
- Elimination of Kiowa fleet results in roughly 40% decrease in Army's attack/reconnaissance battalions (37 to 22)
 - Makes these units a low density/high demand capability
- Restructure thus proposes moving all Apaches from National Guard to AC
 - In return, AC moves about 100 Blackhawks to National Guard
 - Net loss in National Guard inventory is about 100 helicopters (8%)
 - By contrast, AC inventory reduced by about 700 helicopters (23%)

Minus 700 (AC) is not true, as it includes the training fleet of non deployable TH-67s which support both AC and NG.
- Resulting National Guard force is still highly capable combat complement to AC
 - Additional Blackhawks also well suited to state missions and requirements in areas like disaster relief and emergency response

True, but no Guard unit has failed a State mission; at the same time, not one NG ARB failed to meet its requirement to mobilize to OEF/OIF. Why does NG need more UHs, at the expense of AHs?

Budget-driven reductions and need-based realignment

Need-based sizing of total capability, budget-driven realignment by component.

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Most of the 192 Apache helicopters taken from the 8 NG ARBs would not even go into the AC's operational fleet. Rather, they will go to the Non-Operational Fleet (NOF), which includes placement at Ft. Rucker for flight training, 48 in cold storage - CONUS and OCONUS (including Korea), the ORF (Operational Reserve Fleet) a.k.a. combat spares and the test fleet. Additionally, ARI calls for increasing the number of Apaches in each Attack Battalion by 3, from 24 to 27. In this plan the AC would be HOARDING Apaches.

Why not maintain force similarity between the AC and NG as required by Federal Law (Section 104, Title 32 U.S.C. - (b))? This minimizes the number of units lost so as to mitigate the problems associated with a "Low Density/High Demand" asset such as the Apache. ARI proposes the Attack Reconnaissance Squadron (ARS) in the 10 AC CABs will have 24 Apaches. These Apaches will conduct reconnaissance in concert with their 3 Shadow Platoons and 1 Grey Eagle company as proposed by the ARI. Why then do they need 24 Apaches per Squadron, the same number as in the Attack Battalions? If these Recon Squadrons were fielded at 12 Apaches to work with the UASs, and the Attack Battalions remained at 24 vs 27, there are enough Apaches to field 10 AC CABs (10 x 36 = 360) and 6 NG CABs (6 x 36 = 216).

With 16 CABs the number of "Low Density/High Demand" Battalions/Squadrons is 32 as opposed to the 20 in the 10 AC CABs, a 60% increase over ARI. The NOF would retain 114 (690 - 576) Apaches. Additionally, with nearly a third of the Apaches in the NG, where the cost per ARB is \$45m/yr less than an AC ARB (\$77m - \$32m), \$405m/yr can be saved on top of the \$1.1b/yr ARI expects to save (37% increase in annual savings).

Ultimately, this recommendation keeps the AC and NG CAB force structure the same, and increases attack/recon force structure by 60% (in comparison to the ARI). If it took 20 CABs with 35 Attack/Recon Battalions to fight the War on Terror, are we as a Nation willing to cut in half the number of CABs and reduce our Army Aviation ARBs by over 40%?

Army Helicopters

OSD

Keeping 4 types



Apaches



Blackhawks



Chinooks

Losing 3 types



Bell Rangers

Kiowa Warriors
Kiowa Scouts



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Under the ARI, the Army is really only losing one combat airframe, not three: the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. The TH-67 (Bell Rangers) and OH-58A/C (Kiowa Scouts) are non-deployable. The TH-67 would be replaced by the LUH-72 Lakota.

Basis for Restructure

OSD

- Factors considered in deciding restructure mix
 - Operational tempo
 - Training complexity
 - Training time
 - Mission alignment

Operational Tempo


OSD

- Apaches already established as low-density, high-demand asset over past decade – So why further reduce the number of operational units?
 - Every AC Apache battalion deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan at least four times—two deployed six times
 - AC units experienced 1:1.5 ratio of time deployed (Boots on the Ground or BOG) to not deployed (Dwell)—below desired ratio of 1:2
 - RC Apache units also deployed almost every company one or two times, with slight majority deploying only once

Why did one AC ARB deploy 6 times, when the NG ARBs were “raising their hands,” ready to deploy? Although the unit deployed 6 times, its personnel rotated in and out during those 6 deployments. Personnel transfer between units, and there is also a high turn over rate on AC, as people simply leave the service and join the Guard or get out of the military completely. True, many AC soldiers had a high number of deployments in a short time frame – again, NG could have helped with this. Back to back deployments by the AC diminishes esprit de corps, morale, and can be extremely hard on families... and the Army is now dealing with a record number of suicides.

Deployments went from 12 months BOG to 9 months BOG. At the same time, mid-tour leave was being eliminated. How can you expect soldiers to maintain a healthy state of mind if they are 12 not being give time off from time to time?

Apache Deployment History



This slide clearly demonstrates how AC pushed its own personnel into deployments for promotions and career advancements. They could have included NG units to ease the BOG to Dwell ratio, easing the burden on Active Duty equipment, soldiers and their families.

Reasons for Lower NG OPTEMPO

OSD

- In early 2007, SECDEF Gates instituted BOG:Dwell policy of 1:5 for RC units

- "...to distribute more fairly, and more effectively, the burdens of way among our active and reserve components, while providing a more predictable schedule of mobilizations and deployments for troops, their families, and civilian employees."

- RC Apache units recapitalized early with newer models adhered to this rotation policy

Despite this policy, most non-Apache NG units never got up to 1:5 – they were much lower, typically 1:3 or 1:4. NG Apache units had longer dwell times as they were forced to wait for Longbow upgrades.

- Deploying National Guard units fill out end strength by cross leveling personnel from other states—usually by calling for volunteers

- A strength of RC

- However, for Apaches, this means cross-leveling personnel from other National Guard Apache units, which erodes the readiness of those other units, making them less available

The AC also cross levels units by PCS transfers, taking Soldiers from units in reset and pushing them to deploying units. The units not deployed are not at 100% manning just like the NG units. These AC units are being filled with new Soldiers and Aviators who extensive training before the next rotation.

- National Guard units had to upgrade their equipment to most modern and survivable model before deploying to both wars

Initially, some AC units also deployed with older equipment, both to OEF/OIF. Many NG units initially deployed with AH-64A Apaches. These were proven, capable aircraft. As the conflicts continued, some NG units had long dwell times waiting for aircraft upgrades as the AC made the decision to not allow older A Models to deploy. However, it is a fact of life for military procurement that upgrades will be ongoing throughout all combat operations.

Another reason for the lower NG OPTEMPTO is that the AC controls the pre-mobilization train up and validation process. 1st Army, the organization responsible to validate NG units, is not large enough to handle an increase of throughput even if the decision was made to increase the number of NG units to deploy. Better to use 1st Army for oversight, and have the states conduct home station mobilization and validation. This would result in huge cost savings, faster mobilization and more availability of NG units.

NOTE: One critical issue with 1st Army is that some of the evaluators had either never deployed to theater where the NG unit was deploying to, or had never deployed at all.

Why is NG post mobilization required by 1st Army? It is costly, inefficient, and ineffective. Active CABs are validated by their higher HQ and sent into theater with no standard training or validation requirements.

→ **What recent experience? Where's the data? There is nothing out there to support this. If anything, the safety and combat record of the Guard proves the opposite.**

Training Complexity

OSD

- Recent experience suggests units requiring high degree of collective training should reside generally reside in AC
 - Collective training = Training to achieve proficiency in large-unit combined arms maneuver and cross-service integration
 - Apaches fall into this category

Performance experience suggests the opposite: at the very least, that AC and NG performed equally in combat. Most ground elements didn't know if it was an AC or NG Apache overhead.

- AC Apache units train about 200 days/year
 - Maintain battalion/brigade level proficiency
 - Collocated with ground units **All States have ground elements, and NG ARBs and ground units train frequently, giving ample time to refine Air-to-Ground Integration (AGI).**
- RC Apache units train 39 days plus extra training days to maintain individual flight proficiency **This means that every deployed NG ARB was not proficient at the company or battalion level. Absolutely false, and the data proves otherwise!**
 - Will, in post-war, occasionally rise to company level proficiency
 - Limited training opportunities with both ground units and other aviation battalions
 - Not suited to collective-skill development **Absolutely false, and the data proves otherwise!**

NG Units train 90-135 days a year, participate in multiple collective, joint exercises with ground and other aviation units as well as other services and nations. AC units spend most time training new aviators at base tasks during the one year at home station between deployments.

AC TRAINING:

AC ARBs train less than 200 days a year – it is in fact much closer to 160 days a year. Here is the math behind this: 52 weeks in a year multiplied by an average 4 day work week (most posts use Friday as a half day, and is used for administrative requirements, not training) = 208 days a year. Subtract 30 days a year for annual leave = 178 days. Subtract 15 days a year for Federal holidays and command passes = 163 days a year. And subtract a few more for the occasional sick day and/or "Safety Down Day," and you're left with approximately 160 days a year. And yet AC soldiers are paid 365 days a year; meanwhile, full benefits are not offered to the Guard, unless deployed. See Slide 17 for additional information on AC training time, complexity and effectiveness.

NG (RC) TRAINING:

NG ARBs aviators and mechanics train, on average, about 100 days a year, and can train up to 135 days a year. Bottom Line? The annual difference in training, between AC and NG, is only 25 – 50 days a year, but NG only costs one-third as much as AC AND operates on the same level of collective training, if not more so. Why? The answer to that lies in three key factors: continuity in personnel, diversity of experience, and year upon year of flight and mechanical experience well over the average AC aviator and mechanic. So even if AC attempts to regularly train their pilots, their turn over rate is so much higher that this training is lost as aviators either leave, retire or join the Guard.

Those "extra days" above the base 39 days are for collective proficiency too, not just individual level training. NG ARBs do Company, Battalion, even Brigade level training, on a frequent basis – to include Guard Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) exercises and Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) training. The Guard also regularly participates in multi-service and multi-national events, including but not limited to: Red Flag; Fighter Weapon School training with the Air Force (Nellis), Navy (Fallon), & USMC (MAWTS); MCMWTC; Desert Ram... just to name a few.

Training complexity can only truly be compared, measured, and substantiated in two ways:

1. **Combat Performance** – find anything showing that NG, on average, was in anyway less capable than AC. Not just teams of 2, but large air assaults, COIN, and CAM.
2. **Safety Record.** In the last 5 years, AC has crashed well over a dozen Apaches due to pilot error. In the same time frame, the NG has had no Class A accidents due to "pilot error." At \$30 million an Apache, this is a staggering loss by AC.

More often than not, it was Guard Apache pilots teaching Active Duty, not the other way around. During the OEF RIPS, the incoming AC aviators struggled to learn the concepts from the Guard and were barely able to take over the mission prior to Guard ARBs leaving country. The majority of the AC aviators and mechanics are very inexperienced in comparison and had a difficult time picking up the required skills. Many Active Duty SPs and "experienced" pilots required extensive training to assume the OEF mission and underwent what is known as "RIP Shock." As a result, some AC ARBs had trouble with timely and effective OEF Troops-in-Contact (TIC) support and air-ground integration and requested help from the outgoing Guard ARBs.

It all goes back to continuity and decades of longevity in a unit – which the Guard clearly has, and Active Duty does not. The superior experience and continuity of the Guard allows the senior aviators to train and maintain decades of experience. Something that Active Duty obviously struggles with.

Mission Differences

OSD

- One way this collective-training readiness difference between AC and RC Apache units manifested itself was in the way units were used in the wars **The way the units were used in combat was a direct result of the deployment schedule, not training differences.**
- Army made 76 deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan with Apache battalions
 - 75% of deployments were in support of combined-arms maneuver (CAM) or counter-insurgency (COIN) missions
 - The balance were security missions—escorting logistics convoys, command groups, or transport aircraft—which require less training than CAM/COIN **See notes on related information on doctrinal attack helicopter missions that show how this data is inaccurate and misleading.**
- Table shows percentage of missions assigned to AC and NG

	Active Component	National Guard
CAM	100%	0%
COIN	89%	11%
Security	49%	51%

These data points are incoherent and not based on attack/recon aviation doctrine or any factual evidence. Arbitrary and vague statistics like this are intentionally misleading.

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These data points are incoherent and not based on attack/recon aviation doctrine or any factual evidence. The assumption, without supporting data, is that the training the AC conducts makes them more capable than the NG.

The more logical and factually supported answer for why the AC received “different missions” was that the AC was in charge of the deployment schedule. That schedule more than any factor decided what missions were conducted by which component. The only units deployed for the first year of OEF/OIF were AC ARBS. For 3 years prior to and immediately following 9/11/, the NG deployed to Kuwait for Operation Desert Spring where they were expected to execute any attack helicopter mission that may arise if Iraq again invaded. They were there on 9/11 but were not employed in the initial support of either OEF or OIF. It was a schedule that decided (by AC) the missions in that first year, not the training of the units.

Attack aviation – AC and NG – does not perform Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) or Counter Insurgency (COIN) missions. Attack aviation supports ground forces conducting those missions with attack, recon, security and movement to contact missions. Other than the first ARBs into Afghanistan and Iraq supporting the invading ground forces, when a few deliberate attacks and movement to contact took place, the vast majority of all Attack/Recon Missions were either a security mission or a hasty attack.

The NG performed EXACTLY the same missions that AC did, with exception of that first round of deployments. Ironically, it was during that first deployment in Iraq when the single largest failure of any Attack mission occurred in the history of the Attack Helicopters, when 2 battalions were rendered combat ineffective at Karbala – additionally, one Apache was lost and 2 aviators taken prisoner.

From 2003 to 2007, NG ARBs from NC, UT, ID, & AZ rotated through Afghanistan, when there was only 1 ARB for the ENTIRE country – those Guard units had EVERY mission across OEF and conducted numerous hasty attacks and security missions in support of CAM and COIN. All NG units deployed to Iraq performed exactly the same missions as the AC units there at the time. From 2012 to 2014, NG ARBS from UT, PA, & MO were given the task of nightly direct support to Tier 1 Special Operations, including numerous hasty attacks and HVT kinetic strikes in some of the most challenging terrain in the country.

Training Time

OSD

- Time to ready NG aviation units for deployment differed depending on degree of collective training required

Some units are better than others – whether AC or NG. The recent deployment of 1-2 CAV, known as "Half Attack," was delayed because this AC unit was NOT ready to deploy. As a result, they had a one year delay in mobilization and another unit took their place on the deployment.

- Table below shows the range of pre- and post-mobilization training times for helos in NG combat aviation brigades

The table below is fundamentally flawed – NG ARBs had to do a 4 month UFTP before they could deploy with the AH-64D. Post Mobilization time for any NG aviation unit is about the same. Now that all Guard ARBs are UFTP complete, this isn't a factor. However, all AC ARBs went through a 180 day UFTP and by their own claim train 200 days each year in between their deployments.

	Training time (days)
Chinook	75-100
Medevac	80-110
Blackhawk	120-140
Apache	150-180

Once UFTP is complete, mobilization of an NG Apache unit is the same as any other NG aviation unit.

~~Other helos can be readied faster to meet warfighting needs~~

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Strategic Air Lift Limits how fast any unit can get into theater. If it can't be moved in the first 60 days of conflict, we're paying AC units for a reaction time we can't use because NG units will be ready by then.

The table is also skewed because NG ARBs did not have an opportunity to deploy a second time after UFTP – this train up would have been much, much faster. Most units estimate they could have mobilized in 30 - 60 days.

AC units never got to 1:2 BOG to Dwell – the ARBs were running 1:1.1 or 1:1.2, meaning they were deploying much more frequently than they were intended to. As mentioned on Slide 12, this is something the NG ARBs were more than willing to help with. As a result, the AC lost some of their senior experienced aviators leaving AC due to burn out. This resulted in a substantial lowering of the average experience level of its remaining aviators. Then Vice Chief of Staff GEN Cody re-directed 21st CAV BDE to place training resources back in these AC ARBs rather than focus on the 21st CAV charter: training units to prepare for UFTP – which at the time directly affected NG ARBs, since they were placed last on the list for UFTP. AC aviators are often so “green” that they needed all the help they could get – so how is it possible that AC ARBs are better than NG ARBs at collective training?

Although the AC has 160 to perhaps 200 days of training per year, they were constantly having to retrain the same basic skills over and over. With 50% of the aviators in a unit being new pilots fresh out of flight school, they could not progress beyond the basics to advanced tactics necessary to safely and effectively operate in theater. This is why GEN Cody sent 21st CAV Instructor Pilots (IP) to the AC units. This led to the NG IPs training their own pilots during pre-deployment training and UFTP. Because of their decades of experience, not only was NG training their own aviators not a problem but they were asked to train many of the AC IPs in advanced tactics and power management.

"Fight Tonight" is a misconception; a fallacy. Even when our Nation was 100% surprised by events of 9/11, it still took 27 days for Special Ops to move in country – not regular Active Duty forces.

Mission Alignment

OSD

- "Fight tonight" reality means we need low-density, high-demand assets in the active force
 - The ARI forces "low-density, high demand," and this plan is not only unnecessary, but counter productive to our Nation's security.
 - Must be ready to go quickly to the fight

NG units can easily fall into rotation immediately behind regular AC or even Special Ops forces. NG units in ARFOGEN "Ready Year" can be ready immediately, i.e. 30 days. Others could be ready in 60 days.

- Apaches don't have a state mission
 - Blackhawks do

False. Apache can play a key factor in DOMOPs, including but not limited to: Search and Rescue (SAR), Aerial Command and Control, Damage Assessments, Fire Fighting spotting, and the logistics capability that will support all aviation and most ground activities in the State. States with Apache units are relying heavily on equipment, soldiers, and staff to execute aviation missions.

The Guard has NEVER failed to complete a State mission by being sized, manned, trained, and equipped for combat. But if you size, man, train, equip exclusively for State missions, NG units cannot pivot to a combat role.

~~Based the mix on what's needed~~

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Base the size of the force on what's needed (threat assessment and risk acceptance), then base the AC to RC mix on what the budget can afford

How much of the AC ARBs can be moved in those 60 days, based off the limit of Strategic Air Lift? The point is that by the time AC is deployed to a conflict, NG ARBs will be ready to deploy immediately after AC.

Every CONUS based unit – AC or NG – is part of the reserve. In reality, every unit is in reserve until they are deployed *in* country.

Summary

OSD

- Budget pressure: we must make the Army smaller

→ Not true. What is true is that our Nation must spend less money on the Army, but not necessarily at the expense of Force Structure.

- Total Force response, no matter the mission

→ True – each component, including NG, must be capable of conducting *all* missions. That's the first charter of the NG. The Guard needs to mirror Active Duty, in every way.

- Base the mix on mission complexity, urgency, responsiveness, and needs

- “Fight tonight”: combat elements must be in AC
- A smart combat complement in National Guard
- Consider state needs

→ False. “Fight Tonight” is really a SOF mission. Placing all combat elements in the AC violates the law and Constitutional intent for an armed and well regulated militia and separation of powers.

It is the opposite. It reduces the total force mix. It isn't just about the State. The Guard is constitutionally mandated to defend the entire NATION.

In summary, the ARI eliminates ~40% of the Attack/Recon battalions, which results in a substantial loss in trained personnel and dramatically increases the vulnerability of the Army for the next 15 – 20 years and beyond.

NG ARBs bring strengths to the fight that AC, by its nature, cannot. Critical, intangible factors such as continuity in personnel, diversity of experience, and year upon year of flight and mechanical experience.

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